The question of how to reconcile the practice of national security intelligence with the values on which liberal democracies are understood to be based was very much present at the creation of Intelligence Studies. At a time when the conceptual landscape of Intelligence Studies has broadened, this article represents a revisiting of these first principles. In it, I explain the normative tension between the requirements of liberal democratic orders and the practice of national security intelligence as arising from three sources. First, the confusions that arise from liberalism itself as an ideology. Second, the constraining effect of the international. Third, the constraining 'problem' of the nature of the liberal democratic state. In light of these and contemporary anxieties about the implications of intelligence practice for liberal values, I discuss how far it is possible or useful to think in terms of 'liberal intelligence' and what its core characteristics might be held to be.
Introduction
History clearly shows that the practice of national security intelligence by liberal states can exist in tension with the values that the state formally espouses and from which it derives its legitimacy, giving rise to a sense of liberal caution, if not ambivalence, about the role of intelligence. Indicative of this, over the years much media focus on intelligence in liberal democracies has been premised on the potential harms that the excessive or poorly regulated practice of intelligence can cause. That a focus on oversight and accountability has developed as a central element of academic Intelligence Studies is a further expression of this caution, as is its increased focus on questions of intelligence ethics in recent years. Indeed, the academic study of intelligence arose to a large extent in response to concerns about the operation of intelligence in a democratic polity. However, what are often implicit questions about the relationship between liberalism, the liberal state and intelligence and the possibilities of developing what we might term 'liberal intelligence' are worthy of more systematic discussion. In this article I discuss intelligence in relation to liberalism as an ideology and its role in the liberal state in order to pose the question of how far it is possible to talk in terms of liberal intelligence? What are the expectations implicit in the term and what are the obstacles in the way of realizing them? What would be its defining characteristics? The approach is broadly rooted in historical sociology and in effect makes the case for the enduring relevance of approaches to the study of intelligence that were present at the creation of Intelligence Studies. 
Confusions: the ideological dimension -liberalism and intelligence
Liberalism is a diffuse and dynamic ideology that comprises a collection of ideas, the relative weight of which vary across contexts, whose relationship to each other is not fixed and, consequently, whose meaning can be contested. It is not characterized by any sense of programmatic coherence. Nevertheless, with its emphasis on themes such as tolerance and openness, liberalism has been associated with a clear sense of moral values that has informed expectations regarding liberal performance in respect of politics and the state. Michael Freeden has suggested that as an ideology liberalism can be held to comprise seven core political concepts that interact with each other: liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, sociability, the general interest, and limited and accountable power. 2 However, there is no clear guide to how these should be reconciled within state structures, or sense of prioritization. For example, how should the liberal democratic state seek to reconcile liberty with the general interest or limited and accountable power? What does the ideology of liberalism lose when conjoined with democracy in the form of the liberal-democratic state? How should this impact on expectations as to what liberalism will deliver? These expectations have been particularly high since the Second World War when, in the context of the Cold War contest, liberal democracy was routinely conflated with 'freedom' . Moreover, the tendency to equate the two survived the Cold War, and intelligence agencies and managers have certainly played their part in this. 3 While liberals are assumed to be internationalists, when applied in the context of the international system, this collection of ideas offers no clear guide as to how liberal democracies should interact with the world beyond liberal borders or how that world might impact on the liberal state itself. For example, if it is possible to reduce the danger facing citizens of a liberal state by following a course of action that reduces the rights of some people in other states (whether liberal or not), how should liberals respond? Finally, on this reading, security may well be assumed to correspond to, or be an element within, the general interest, but its pursuit does not feature as one of the core ideas driving support for liberalism, meaning that its pursuit can instead be seen as being in conflict with those core ideas.
This almost inevitably gives rise to conflicting demands and even to a sense of liberal incoherence. We can see this regularly in opinion polling that pitches values of 'freedom' or privacy against security. To take a couple of examples; some six months after the Edward Snowden leaks, in January 2014, the Pew Research Center asked whether those polled approved of US government surveillance of citizens' telephone and internet communications. A majority (53%) disapproved, while just 40% approved. Yet, at the end of the following year (shortly after the Paris terrorist attacks) a poll asking whether the US government had gone far enough to protect the country found only 28% thought it had while 56% thought it had not. 4 These polls clearly illustrate the liberal tension over domestic security intelligence, and also suggest the significant impact of the international on the national. I will discuss the roots of liberal tension in each of these in the following sections, and the way in which they constrain what might be held to be liberal expectations, beginning with the international.
Constraints I: liberal intelligence and the international
Michael Warner writes in the introduction to his history of intelligence that, 'intelligence is a business that should not be glorified. It carries physical and moral costs, even when performed in a just cause. Even as necessary wars are themselves bloody and brutish when seen up close, spying is often a bad thing in and of itself, and only defensible in light of the alternatives' . 5 Warner's war parallel suggests that the liberal dilemma over intelligence may well contain similarities with the liberal dilemma that Michael Howard identified with regard to war; that it was understood as 'a necessary evil arising from a social organization which itself was necessary to keep in check yet greater evils' . 6 Hence, Howard tells us, 'overwhelmingly, when they went to war in 1914, liberals everywhere did so with a clear conscience. They were fighting for irreproachable causes: to assert or to defend national rights; to defend their native soil against invasion; or, in the case of the British, to uphold the Gladstonian concept of the public law of Europe' .
Taken together, Warner and Howard remind us of the reality that the international contexts in which intelligence is required are fundamentally competitive ones. In these, as Michael Warner has pointed out, while 'many national leaders may feel themselves swept along by historical tides, there have been some important ones who saw their nations as shapers of history' 8 -or, in the language of realism, that the international system contains both status quo and revisionist states. Hence, while liberal democracies tend to highlight the defensive nature of intelligence capabilities, this does not represent a natural limit on intelligence activity. The contemporary landscape is further complicated by the way in which notions of offence and defence have become so intimately bound together as to not be easily distinguishable -for example, with regard to the pre-emptive (often, in reality, preventive) intelligence role in 'war on terror' paramilitary operations and, perhaps even more significantly, with regard to the realm of cyber security. 9 John Mearsheimer has identified five assumptions about the international system that underpin offensive realism: that great powers are the main actors in world politics, and operate in an anarchic international system; that all states possess some offensive military capability; that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states; that the main goal of states is survival; and that states are rational actors. 10 It is the uncertainty arising from the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions that explains the need for intelligence. The challenge here is that 'it is almost impossible to discern another state's intentions with a high degree of certainty' because they 'cannot be empirically verified' , rather they are to be found 'in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern' . Moreover; even if one could determine another state's intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to know who will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is not to say that states can be certain that their neighbours have or will have revisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are dealing with a revisionist or status quo state.
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The international realm is, on this understanding, an inherently competitive one where states aim to make relative gains which, because they are relative, will be at the expense of other states. Even in Thomas More's Utopia (first published in 1516) war is a reality because More accepted that, in the words of Michael Howard, 'European society was organised in a system of states in which war was an inescapable process for the settlement of differences in the absence of any higher common jurisdiction' . 12 While the Utopians detested war they considered themselves to be justified in engaging in it to acquire land from other states if it was judged to be uncultivated. As More explained; 'they account it a very just cause of war for a nation to hinder others from possessing a part of that soil of which they make no use, but which is suffered to lie idle and uncultivated …' 13 Hence, even the Utopians were likely to act in a revisionist manner if interests and opportunities were aligned.
Essentially, this is the understanding of the international -where levels of trust are low and qualified at best -on which state investment in intelligence is premised. The richer states that benefit most from the international status quo will be the most sensitive to challenges to it and so invest significantly in foreign intelligence capabilities. This is consistent with the first of Loch Johnson's propositions for a theory of intelligence, that: 'The more affluent and globally oriented a nation, the larger its agenda of intelligence objectives and its institutional apparatus for espionage, and the more likely its chances for a large number of successes as a result of this saturated world coverage' . 14 We should note here that ideology is not identified as a key variable by Johnson; it is not proposed that liberal democracies will be more restrained in their range of intelligence collection practices or engagement in intelligence actions flowing from these. However, states that are dissatisfied with the international status quo may challenge or seek to disrupt it and use intelligence as a vehicle for doing so, for example via the use of offensive cyber strategies. Hence, the competitive realm of the international system as understood through the prism of realism can require intelligence to be deployed in defence of interests. At times, though, these can be held to be synonymous with wider liberal values, as in the response to what was assessed to be Russian state interference in the 2016 US presidential election. The January 2017 report from the US National Intelligence Council began by framing Russian interference as an attack on liberal values: 'Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's long-standing desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations' . 15 Liberal-democratic states' intelligence engagement in this competitive, low-trust arena, needs to be regulated if it is to respect limits and ensure the engagement does not compromise the values on which society is held to be based. But precisely how it should be regulated and where lines should be drawn regarding what is acceptable in defending national interests and values has eluded consensus. Liberals have always faced the question of how their values should inform their approach to citizens of other states, especially if the requirements of collective solidarity appear to conflict with core liberal principles. National intelligence practices and the legal frameworks that provide for them make a clear distinction between limits that must be applied to citizens of the state in question and those of other states -for example, with regard to surveillance or more physical forms of intelligence collection. This no more than reflects the reality that, at the end of the day, the business of national intelligence agencies is national security.
Thinking about this question of how core liberal principles should be reconciled with the competitive logic of the international system was galvanized by the rise of the ideology of human rights. This challenged the classical liberal, state-centric, understanding of the nature of human rights that was rooted in the idea of the Rights of Man as it emerged from the American and French Revolutions. These rights were to be provided via the state in which the bourgeoisie had now secured representation (and who, consequently, now had a role in framing those rights). 16 However, the rise of the ideology of human rights represented a challenge to this state-centric approach, viewing human rights instead as 'entitlements that might contradict the sovereign nation-state from above and outside rather than serve as its foundation' . 17 Individual human rights transcended states; they were not state-given or state-defined, but instead existed independently of the state. As Samuel Moyn has set out, there were a number of reasons for the rise of this ideology during the 1970s (after the false dawn of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights following which progress was frozen in the permafrost of Cold War), but one of the most significant was the; 'perceived crisis of the postcolonial world [which] made the globalization of the nation-state unattractive as the sole formula for the achievement of modern freedom. Accordingly, rights lost their long connection with revolution' .
18 But a second was what Moyn identifies as the 'crisis of popular consent for the machinations of Cold War geopolitics' which led to people seeking alternative internationalist ideologies. 19 The Cold War intelligence competition was certainly one element of these machinations. So too was the US prosecution of its war in Vietnam. As Michael Howard put it in War and the Liberal Conscience; 'the appalling suspicion began to grow among liberals in the United States that the United States, the very embodiment of democratic and peaceful values, might, as it approached the end of its second century, be waging a murderously oppressive war against a small people struggling to be free' . 20 The concurrent crack-down on domestic opponents of the war and what were perceived to be subversive groups challenging the authority of the state was spearheaded by the FBI. When this programme, COINTELPRO, was exposed in 1971 it caused liberal outrage (see discussion below).
The reaction that followed gave rise to the Church Committee investigation and the adoption of a human rights foreign policy by the Carter Administration. The core challenge that these developments implied for national intelligence organisations was that not only did states have an obligation to avoid engaging in activities that would infringe these rights, they also had an obligation to intervene where these rights were being denied or seriously compromised by other states. All of this implied a shift away from a sole rationalization of intelligence interventions on ends-based national interest grounds to one that also considered the impact on the rights of non-nationals. One consequence of the rise of the international human rights agenda was the consensus around the need to prevent genocide and intervene pre-emptively to do so. 21 In the 1990s, having failed to intervene in Rwanda, Western intelligence demonstrated that it could play a role in the international politics of human rights by informing intervention in the Balkans to prevent or minimize mass state killing and then playing a role in apprehending war criminals from the conflict. This did pose challenges initially for Western intelligence services given their 'East-West mentality' and expectations of the 'enemy' , built up over years of observing the behaviour of the Soviet Union and its allies, which were at odds with the situation presented by the war in Bosnia. 22 With regard to the question of how far the liberal state should co-operate by providing intelligence to the United Nations in support of UN peacekeeping missions in general, there has been evidence of clear progress since the 1950s and 1960s and some UN operations have seen encouraging levels of international intelligence co-operation, especially where the state in question has had troops deployed in support of a particular peacekeeping mission.
However, intelligence co-operation with the UN in support of humanitarian objectives remains subject to the kind of suspicion that surrounds all intelligence co-operation, heightened in the case of the UN by the number of players involved and their global nature. 23 Moreover, international intelligence co-operation aimed at preventing human rights abuses depends on the existence of a sufficient international consensus on which to develop co-operation in the first place. Acute divisions over contemporary conflicts, such as Syria, which have left national intelligence bodies playing covert roles in support of their favoured side or element, indicate how the possibilities for national intelligence support for human rights aims are inextricably linked to the wider international security environment.
In light of such divisions around the more minimalist human rights positions (e.g., whether to intervene to prevent the widespread killing of civilians in Syria, Yemen, etc.), it seems inevitable that adhering to the more aspirational maximalist human rights positions was always going to represent a challenge for national intelligence practice. In part this reflects differences in national approaches and responses to the concept of individual human rights. It also reflects how national intelligence practice is affected by the invocation of states of exception (discussed further below in the domestic context). In such contexts international human rights could pose a problem for intelligence practice, especially for the US in the context of the post-9/11 'war on terror' . 24 The creation of the International Criminal Court based in The Hague heightened US concerns that the development of international law (specifically, the concept of universal jurisdiction), together with an enforcement mechanism, could lead to prosecution of officials where their conduct was held to involve war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Bush Administration notified the UN that it did not intend to become a party to the treaty. The 2002 US National Security Strategy made clear that: 'We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept' . 25 Indeed, in the month prior to its publication, President Bush had signed into law the American Service Members' Protection Act, known as the 'Hague Invasion Act' because it authorized the use of military force to free any US citizen being held by the Court. 26 The cumulative challenge that the rise of international law posed for US conduct in the 'war on terror' gained further formal recognition in the March 2005 Defense Strategy of the United States. In discussing US vulnerabilities, this treated judicial processes as an equivalent weapon of the weak to terrorism, by explaining that: 'Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism' . 27 Hence, the most affluent and globally oriented liberal state could not afford to be bound by the rules-based international system it had helped create when it came to national security intelligence practices.
Constraints II: liberal intelligence and the state
Traditional notions of a neat and clean international-domestic divide have been altered by the consequences of globalization. For example, James Rosenau has talked of the erosion of state sovereignty, which is nevertheless and inevitably, 'still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can still throw their weight around … Borders still keep out intruders, but they are also more porous. Landscapes are giving way to ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes and finanscapes, but territoriality is still a central preoccupation for many people' . 28 Notwithstanding the changing nature of borders, at the domestic level the possibility of liberal intelligence must be approached in relation to the question (or problem) of the state. Intelligence represents a long-standing function common to all states. Indeed, the practice of intelligence in defence of the state or realm predates the emergence of the liberal state. As Machiavelli noted in Discourses on Livy, the 'actions of citizens should be watched, for often such as seem virtuous conceal the beginning of tyranny' . 29 The concept of the state is, of course, a contested one, with no consensus regarding what it is, should be, or the most appropriate relationship between state and citizen. The liberal theory of the state associated with the writings of John Locke was a theory of limited state power, in which the function of the state was restricted to law enforcement aimed at the protection of the individual and their property. Ironically, perhaps, this gave rise to a focus on the coercive capacity of the state -the means by which it would ensure these rights. This, in turn, gave rise to the oxymoronic position wherein the liberal state was required to defend 'itself against the consequences of its own liberalism' . 30 Liberals did not walk lightly down this path, aware of the tension generated from requiring a coercive apparatus to ensure liberty, but neither did they see an alternative (itself something of an admission of the utopian streak within classical liberalism). As Abraham Lincoln observed during the US Civil War: 'It has long been a grave question whether any government not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain its liberties in great emergencies' . The very need to exercise a monopoly of legitimate force arises only because states are challenged by rebels and criminals who themselves resort to force, and who (either implicitly or explicitly) contest the legitimacy of the laws they break … The state which actually succeeds in imposing a monopoly of legitimate force thereby makes itself redundant since a gulf between ideals and reality is essential to the state's very raison d'être. 34 These challenges come from those who contest the territorial claims of the state and reject the territorial identity ascribed to them, or from those who reject individual policies, whether economic or political. These challenges -and the potential for them (or, in Hoffman's terms, their inevitability) -generate the requirement for intelligence. The problem of challenge is exacerbated in the case of the liberal state which is in part defined by the spaces for freedom of thought, speech and organization that it provides but which facilitate the spread of ideas that challenge aspects of state authority. The logical outcome of this tension is that at any one time the liberal state, as much as any other state form, will use intelligence in the protection of some citizens and their interests against others, although the nature of 'the others' will not be a constant.
We can see recognition of this basic tension facing the liberal state expressed in slightly different form by James Madison in one of his contributions to the late 1780s' debate surrounding the ratification of the new US Constitution. Madison clearly understood that the very nature of the liberal state that would be created by ratification would create spaces that gave rise to factionalism. 'As long as the reason of man continues fallible' , Madison wrote, 'and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed … A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well as speculation as of practice … have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good' . 35 The causes of faction, Madison believed, could not be removed and consequently 'relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects' . 36 On this reading, domestic intelligence agencies may be considered the means developed by the liberal state to control the effects of the factionalism inherent in the concept of the liberal state, but which could not be allowed to challenge the liberal state itself. That this may be held by some liberals to involve the denial of the 'right of revolution' against government set out by John Locke in his Two Treatises of Government as a key part of the social contract serves to emphasize the intractable nature of the problem created by liberal expectations within state structures.
Second, the Weberian concept of the state sees the state developing a set of institutions with specialist staffs. This opens up a space in which state managers develop discrete interests and understandings of their agency's role on behalf of the state, thus helping give form to a state-society divide in which the interests of the two are not necessarily synonymous. In no aspect of state activity has this been more apparent than with regard to security, where state managers in liberal democracies have at times enjoyed considerable latitude in identifying dangerous factions.
This Weberian approach to defining and studying the state has met with criticism for being, in essence, one-dimensional and not providing a full account of what the state actually does (for example, the positive role of the state in welfare provision), or of the relationship between law, state and compliance, or the role and influence of social movements or interest groups, or the broader question of how state legitimacy is maintained. 37 Moreover, the focus on globalization and its consequences from the 1990s gave rise to a quite common view that the state was no longer the central unit of analysis that it once was, its authorities and boundaries becoming compromised and its power more limited. And yet, the state survived globalization and continued to assert its Weberian monopoly inside its territory (sometimes with the necessary help of international allies). Even if it has been unable to achieve this (as per John Hoffman) the important point lies in the act of assertion itself which involves a central role for intelligence and security agencies. Moreover, alongside a shift in the role of the state (for example, seeing an increased role for the private sector in performing what had hitherto been regarded as state roles, including with regard to security and intelligence) we have witnessed trends that strengthen it in Weberian terms; most significantly, the way in which advances in electronic communications, interception and hacking technologies have extended the remit of the richest liberal states way beyond the water's edge of their territory, giving a global reach in searching out potential threats, collecting information on them and providing for security inside the state. In short, the Weberian approach retains a relevance for us in thinking about intelligence and national security. 38 The gradual extension of the franchise during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made the liberal state much more inclusive. Still, the limits to the inclusivity of the liberal state at the turn of the twentieth century should not be overlooked. In Britain, the First World War acted as a catalyst accelerating the enfranchisement of working class men (a prospect to which there had been considerable establishment opposition in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century) who had not been eligible to vote when sent to fight for the country. At the time of the Russian Revolution, the Representation of the People Act, which granted all males over 21 the vote (women would wait another ten years for parity), had still not been passed. It is little wonder that the state feared the attractiveness of the Russian example and during the First World War began to monitor pacifists, other anti-war agitators and supporters of the Russian Revolution, and then (from 1920) members of the newly formed Communist Party of Great Britain, attending meetings, surveilling individuals and logging incidents of public disorder.
Through their role in the Second World War and the Cold War, together with a progressive bureaucratization and professionalization of national security intelligence throughout the twentieth century, western intelligence agencies achieved a clear legitimacy as defenders of the liberal order. And yet, there still remained a liberal ambivalence about the nature of intelligence practice, rooted in warnings from the history of liberal states. William Keller has provided a study of one such case; FBI surveillance and disruption of political dissent in the US in the 1950s and 1960s. As Keller argues, understanding the role of domestic intelligence here requires a state-centric perspective. At the head of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover acted as a state manager with wide latitude to apply his own understanding of the interest of the state, a view that became institutionalized over time. As Keller notes: 'FBI administrators themselves adopted a statist point of view, evaluating social disorder and ideologies of the Left and Right in terms of the degree to which each -in their opinion -posed a threat to the state' . 39 To the FBI, Keller argues, 'the social disorder and revolutionary ideologies of the 1960s posed perhaps the most serious threat of subversion in the post-Civil War era' , 40 to which it responded with the counterintelligence programme (COINTELPRO) designed, in the words of a May 1968 memo from FBI headquarters to field offices, to 'expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership and adherents' . A few weeks before this memo was sent, in London an anti-Vietnam War demonstration outside the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square had caught the police unprepared. One consequence of this was the creation of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) which employed similar tactics of infiltration and disruption of dissident groups in a context of considerable autonomy (one indication of which was its poor record-keeping, something that rendered subsequent investigation difficult), and which raised similar awkward questions about the boundaries of legitimate dissent in liberal states; questions which were never asked by those intervening and disrupting. 41 Nevertheless, Keller's core argument applies in both contexts; that during the 1950s and 1960s Hoover's FBI was transformed into something resembling a political police (in that the activities were characterized by the use of aggressive counterintelligence tactics -i.e., interventions -rather than by passive intelligence collection, facilitated by high levels of autonomy arising from either limited oversight or its complete absence), but that this development required -and enjoyed -the support of a liberal constituency. 42 As noted earlier, many liberals were appalled by the COINTELPRO revelations, but many supported the FBI's work in countering radicalism. Western intelligence and security agencies had little difficulty in identifying dangerous factions ('the enemy within') as targets of surveillance and disruption from this time into the twenty-first century.
Concerns: intelligence and liberal anxieties after the Cold War
This liberal ambivalence was not helped by the mixed record of western intelligence performance in the 'war on terror' . As late as 2001, Michael Herman predicted that, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, intelligence would be likely to gain in legitimacy but would nevertheless remain 'in an ethical limbo: accepted as a necessary adjunct to action on good causes, yet still suspected as a grubby activity, not easily fitting into ethical foreign policies' , and characterized attitudes towards intelligence in terms of a realist-idealist dichotomy, writing that: 'Realists follow a Times editorial which said in 1999 that "Cold War or no Cold War, nations routinely spy on each other. " Idealists on the other hand want as little of it as possible. Democracies' attitudes veer between the two' . 43 The conduct of the 'war on terror' raised questions about the use of intelligence power, aided by technological advance, by liberal states. In the case of the US, liberal opinion was divided but some came to the conclusion that intelligence power had developed beyond the point where it was compatible with received notions of liberty, generating contested visions of its place in the general interest. By the end of the George W. Bush Administration there was a palpable sense of this, giving rise to fears of the emergence of a 'new American security state' , a swollen intelligence/counter-terrorism bureaucracy invisible to citizens and directly compromising core liberal principles of limited and accountable power. 44 Some even came to detect a pattern -that the US had been involved in a state of war since Pearl Harbor based on expansive (and excessive) definitions of national security that had given rise to a 'permanent emergency state' which, far from delivering the 'freedom from fear' promised by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, actually depended on citizens' fear for its continuation. 45 In this it is important to recognize that liberalism, like all successful ideologies, has an important teleological dimension, holding out the prospect of progress towards better or successful futures -as in The Whig Interpretation of History or Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. 46 Yet liberalism, in the form of liberal democratic governance, has failed to deliver this, with the progress of the liberal democratic state being far from linear and enduring periodic crises. 47 One contributory factor to this sense of under-delivery is that at times liberal values concerning liberty and individuality are understood to have had to be limited in favour of a prioritization of the general interest (security), resulting in an extension of 'limited' power while a specific crisis is dealt with. However, it has always been an article of liberal faith that once the crisis was successfully resolved these values would be reasserted, state power retreat and accountability be restored. In this, there has been reference to notions of a state of exception that allows for a temporary suspension of the normal rules, and yet the situations in which the de facto suspension of hitherto applied rules (whether formal or informal) has occurred have fallen short of the kinds of emergencies of which Abraham Lincoln, cited earlier, was speaking -of an existential threat to the state. 48 It has long been recognized that works of fiction can be used to gain insights or test understandings of the history and practice of the closed world of intelligence. 49 It has also been recognized that spy fiction has offered a means by which former professionals can express concern about the implications of espionage or about a 'future espionage state' . 50 Here we can usefully illustrate this particular liberal concern via the work of John le Carré and his 1991 novel The Secret Pilgrim, where the George Smiley character reflects on the end of the Cold War with a group of students: 'It's not only our minds we're going to have to reconstruct, either' , Smiley tells them: 'It's the over-mighty modern State we've built for ourselves as a bastion against something that isn't there anymore. We've given up far too many freedoms in order to be free. Now we've got to take them back' . 51 However, with the exception of a brief interregnum between Cold War and 'war on terror' , crisis succeeded crisis and Smiley's call to take back power from the state and 'cut it down to size' 52 was followed instead by a further extension of that power. One consequence is that intelligence has become institutionally embedded as a core feature of the liberal-democratic state, one technologically capable of identifying myriad risks and threats that require an intelligence response. The latest of these involving the cyber realm and hybrid conflict seems to constitute a permanent feature.
In the absence of a readily-definable end-point, there can be no sense that the liberal is acquiescing in a temporary suspension or limiting of liberal freedoms, as in the past; this is a new settlement that begs questions about liberalism as teleological narrative. As a consequence, there is a current within liberalism that sees intelligence not as (or not only as) the provider of security and so guarantor of liberty, but as the force responsible for limiting those freedoms, or redefining the concept.
As le Carré's Smiley explains to the passing-out class in The Secret Pilgrim: 'Spying is eternal … If governments could do without it, they never would. They adore it. If the day ever comes when there are no enemies left in the world, governments will invent them for us, so don't worry. Besides -who says we only spy on enemies? All history teaches us that today's allies are tomorrow's rivals' . 53 In combining liberal concern about the extension of limited power coupled with only limited accountability and with a realist's understanding that it is the nature of the international system that generates the requirement for state investment in intelligence, we can view Smiley as personifying the liberal tension around intelligence; a belief that it is necessary, but perhaps not quite to the extent claimed for it.
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Consents: towards thinking more clearly about 'liberal intelligence'
To return to my initial question, in light of these constraints and the tensions to which they give rise, how far can we talk in terms of liberal intelligence? Where does the essence of liberal intelligence lie? Is it to be found in where the bounds of the permissible are drawn (limited domestic intelligence collection as the natural corollary of limited government)? Does it lie in the confidence that the citizen in the liberal state can take from the operation of oversight and accountability mechanisms and the openness that intelligence managers exhibit in explaining their roles and the threats they guard against via speeches, interviews and agency websites? Or does it lie in the values that liberal intelligence seeks to defend? Is the logic of liberal intelligence inevitably ends-rather than means-based?
It is certainly the case that because of the incompatibility of contemporary intelligence practices with deontological ethical standards, because the purpose of national security intelligence lies in the pursuit of relative advantage (whether in its protection or extension), and because the international system that national intelligence organisations operate in is a competitive one, the tests that we collectively require intelligence to pass have been, to a significant degree, consequentialist ones. We can note here that intelligence professionals have been clear that liberal intelligence can be understood in terms of the ends that are being pursued. For example, consider this excerpt from an interview with former MI5 Director General Eliza Manningham-Buller: Does she reflect on the mirror-image nature of the Cold War spy game? 'You can't make a moral equivalence, ' she says firmly. Still, both sides in the spy war used other people. It must put some iron in the soul, not to mention moral compromises? 'We never forced or extorted people to work for us, ' she replies. As operations director, though, she was responsible for aspects of surveillance, interception and telephone tapping. 'I had the odd sleepless night, but never doubted that we were on the right side. I still feel the same -just with different threats' . 55 Interestingly, the interviewer, Anne McElvoy, had collaborated with Markus Wolf, the former head of the East German Foreign Intelligence Service, on his 1997 memoir which was premised on an equivalence in the Cold War intelligence contest, both of ends and means. 56 This is, of course, also something of the perspective offered via the fiction of John le Carré who, for Michael Herman, portrayed 'cold war intelligence in East and West as two halves of the same rotten apple' . 57 In the context of a competitive international environment in which intelligence organisations are national and owe their primary allegiance to the state where they provide for the defence of the realm or state security, this recourse to consequentialism is understandable. Notwithstanding the attractiveness of an end-based logic, the means used to gather intelligence are still clearly important to liberals, as are the nature of actions taken as a result of intelligence analysis. Liberal democracies have seen sustained discussion of the permissibility of some of the techniques used to gain information in the 'war on terror' . Emblematic has been the discussion of the permissibility of interrogational torture under the guise of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. There are those who on deontological grounds consider this impermissible in any circumstances. Yet there are also many who frame the debate on the territory of interrogational torture's effectiveness: if it is shown that it can be effective, then it is permissible. The Trump presidency has seen something of a revival of the torture debate in these terms. 58 Another way of thinking about liberal intelligence is to focus more on means but to approach it as a theory of restraint based on a nuanced understanding of 'necessity' . 59 This approach recognizes that the international roles and actions of national intelligence agencies contribute to low levels of trust in the international system and that liberal states should seek to avoid as far as possible actions that accentuate this problem. This is not a new insight, in the eighteenth century it formed the basis of Immanuel Kant's antipathy towards the employment of spies. Michael Herman has referred to this same essential problem as constituting an intelligence version of the 'security dilemma'; that intelligence arising from collection may reassure the host state and so raise its confidence, but at the same time the means of, or knowledge of, collection may cause concern on the part of the target state and so undermine its confidence, generating its own further intelligence requirements and interventions. 60 There are problems, however, in understanding 'liberal intelligence' as a theory of restraint: first the preventive mode in which intelligence must operate; second, the technological temptation -seemingly irresistible in a competitive international system. The history of intelligence can be written as the pursuit of relative advantage where the bounds of the permissible in terms of collection reach are determined by technological and financial rather than normative considerations. Moreover, restraint is difficult for liberals to confirm or measure. Absence of evidence could reflect increasing professionalization and reformed organisational culture, or it could reflect effective concealment or inadequate oversight, or some combination of these.
Another approach is to chart the evolution in the development of intelligence and, as part of this, to view the current period as a new era marked by a new, post-Cold War, social contract between state and citizen regarding intelligence. This 'narrative of normalisation' approach has been applied by a number of commentators. In particular, both David Omand and Peter Hennessy have identified a shift from the 'secret state' of the Cold War era to the 'protecting' or 'protective' state of the post-9/11 era of transnational Islamist terrorism. 61 The key feature of this for David Omand was a new relationship between intelligence and citizens defined by the centrality of security to public policy. Not only the nature of national security, but also citizen expectations around it had changed; 'national security today' , Omand argued, 'should be defined as a state of trust on the part of the citizen that the risks to everyday life … are being adequately managed to the extent that there is confidence that normal life can continue' . 62 For his part, Peter Hennessy suggested that, 'during the four decades of Cold War … there have developed three unspoken deals between the UK secret state in its various configurations and the politicians and public it serves' . These were, first; 'that the covert capabilities of the state should be confined to penetrating those elements of external and domestic threats which are beyond the reach unaided of the usual institutions for national protection' . Second; 'that those threats should be as effectively countered as possible either through counter-espionage, civil defence and … resilience planning and investment' . Third; 'that encroachment upon the liberties of the Queen's subjects in pursuit of deals one and two should be as limited as possible in both extent and direction' . 63 This introduced notions of intelligence as a theory of restraint in terms of last resort (that intelligence agencies should not be called upon to provide a solution unless the police etc. could not) and limited exercise of power in the context of necessity that offered a basis for reconciling national security practice with liberal values. At the same time, the idea that the British public had been party to an unspoken deal to this effect might be considered a rather romantic one in a state where the existence of the agencies was not formally avowed until the late 1980s and 1990s, and rather undermined the argument. 64 Low levels of trust, reinforced by the role of intelligence in the Iraq WMD debacle during 2002-2003, required something more explicit.
However, the idea of a more explicit social contract over intelligence, usefully embedded in the approaches adopted by David Omand and Peter Hennessy, continued to gather momentum in the post-9/11 era, especially in the wake of the debates facilitated by the Snowden leaks. These have resulted in a (re)assertion of the importance of informed public consent and, in principle, more extensive oversight arrangements than existed previously. In the case of the UK this debate has also seen the clear articulation of the idea that legitimacy in a liberal context requires a 'democratic licence to operate' , to adopt the title of one government-initiated but independent post-Snowden review, 65 to be regularly renewed in the wake of public debate on that licence. This promise of consultation complemented by more thorough ongoing legislative and judicial oversight, the former incorporating a much more substantial public education role than previously pursued, may well be the basis for a temporary liberal democratic settlement of the tensions exposed by Snowden given what might be understood to be the necessary readjustment of liberal expectations in an era of multi-level security risks brought about by the confluence of political transformation, global instability, high levels of uncertainty and rapid technological innovation. This line of argument recognizes that 'liberal intelligence' can only ever be an approach to mitigating inevitable tensions, partly as a result of the rapidity of technological advance in this area and its transformative impact. This dynamism must beg questions about the feasibility of attaining a settled state of 'liberal intelligence' .
Ultimately, then, a clear answer to the question of how far we can talk about liberal intelligence is elusive, reflecting the multiple understandings of 'liberalism' , the nature of the liberal state and the constantly evolving security environment. The 'liberal intelligence' question must be asked at the national level as a question of political culture, and then answered twice; first relating to how the liberal state interacts with the world beyond the state (while recognizing the permeable and jagged nature of the boundary that separates the two), and second relating to how it operates towards its citizens and residents. The basket of values that comprises liberalism cannot of itself provide a reliable guide as to the priorities to be pursued. Any answers must also recognize the impact of the international on the national -first as driver of intelligence activity in generating security concerns, and then as constraint on intelligence behaviour through the impact of international human rights norms and legal guarantees.
The operation of intelligence agencies impacts on judgements regarding just how liberal any given liberal state can be said to be. To borrow from Charles Tilly, and notwithstanding the challenges that the concept faces, if we are to think in terms of 'liberal intelligence' we must aim to go beyond a simple checklist of formal attributes to ask more evaluative questions that allow meaningful, value-based judgements to be made over time. 66 In this respect, I end this discussion by suggesting three linked questions or themes via which we can begin to get a measure of 'liberal intelligence': (1) tolerance -the scope of domestic political dissent/opposition that is tolerated free of surveillance and interference, including clarity over who makes these (subjective) decisions and reviews them; (2) the nature and effectiveness of oversight and degree of openness/information flow to the public outside of formal oversight arrangements; and (3) the existence of a licence to operate, the regularity of its renewal and the amount of information available to inform decisions about this.
Notes
